University of Cincinnati Law Review
Volume 79

Issue 4

Article 6

October 2011

INDEFINITE DETENTION OF SPECIALLY DANGEROUS
REMOVABLE ALIENS: HERNANDEZ-CARRERA V. CARLSON AND
THE IMPORTANCE OF AGENCY DEFERENCE
Kathleen Cassidy

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr

Recommended Citation
Kathleen Cassidy, INDEFINITE DETENTION OF SPECIALLY DANGEROUS REMOVABLE ALIENS:
HERNANDEZ-CARRERA V. CARLSON AND THE IMPORTANCE OF AGENCY DEFERENCE, 79 U. Cin. L. Rev.
(2011)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss4/6

This Student Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of
Law Scholarship and Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information,
please contact ronald.jones@uc.edu.

Cassidy: INDEFINITE DETENTION OF SPECIALLY DANGEROUS REMOVABLE ALIENS: HER
J-CASSIDY

9/4/2011 1:23:44 PM

INDEFINITE DETENTION OF SPECIALLY DANGEROUS
REMOVABLE ALIENS: HERNANDEZ-CARRERA V.
CARLSON AND THE IMPORTANCE OF AGENCY
DEFERENCE
Kathleen L. Cassidy*

I. INTRODUCTION
After serving time in prison for serious criminal offenses, aliens
Santos Hernandez-Carrera and Pablo Santiago Hernandez-Arenado were
taken into custody by United States immigration officials and have each
been detained for more than fifteen years. 1 During their detention, both
men were diagnosed with severe mental illnesses. 2 Immigration judges
issued orders to remove them from the country, concluding that they
would pose a serious community threat to the community if released. 3
Because Cuba, their native country, refused to accept the two aliens, the
U.S. government was unable to remove them and, consequently,
detained them indefinitely. 4
The lack of uniformity in federal immigration law among the federal
circuit courts calls into question the permissibility of the indefinite
detention of aliens who are ordered removed. 5 As a result of the circuit
split, a mentally ill alien with a violent criminal history could be
detained indefinitely in one part of the country and released in another
after a six-month period. Further complicating this issue is the difficulty
(and necessity) of balancing due process rights with the public’s safety.
The removal process begins when Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), an agency of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), determines that an alien 6 is subject to removal. 7 Following
* Associate Member, 2010–2011 University of Cincinnati Law Review. The author would like
to give special thanks to her family and Richard Tranter for their continued love and encouragement.
1. Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1242–44 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 1011 (2009).
2. Id. at 1242–44.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id.; Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 482 (5th Cir. 2008); Thai v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 790,
791–92 (9th Cir. 2004).
6. Alien is defined as “[a] person who resides within the borders of a country but is not a citizen
or subject of that . . . country.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 30 (3rd pocket ed. 2006).
7. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DEPORTATION BY DEFAULT: MENTAL DISABILITY, UNFAIR
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arrest, ICE begins deportation proceedings. 8 A series of hearings are
then scheduled in immigration court to determine whether the alien is
entitled to remain in the United States. 9 If an immigration judge issues a
final order of removal, the alien may appeal to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA). 10 Should the alien lose this appeal, the alien “may file a
petition for review of this decision with the appropriate [f]ederal
[c]ircuit [c]ourt of [a]ppeals.” 11 In extraordinary cases, the United
States Supreme Court will review lower court decisions. 12
Following an order of removal, indefinite detention becomes an issue
when the government is unable to effectuate the alien’s removal within a
reasonable time. 13 An alien is typically held in custody for the ninetyday statutory removal period, during which the government works to
secure the alien’s removal from the United States. 14 After this period,
the alien may be released from detention, subject to supervision, if the
government is unable to succeed in removal efforts. 15 If, however, the
alien is determined to be “specially dangerous,” the alien may be
detained indefinitely, despite both the expiration of the statutory removal
period and the fact that the alien is unlikely to be removed. 16 A
“specially dangerous” alien detained indefinitely is, however, entitled to
periodic assessments of this status by an immigration court. 17 Further,
the detainee may challenge the continued detention by filing a petition
for habeas corpus in federal district court. 18
Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson created a split among the federal
circuit courts when the Tenth Circuit determined that indefinite
detention of removable aliens was permissible under certain “special
circumstances.” Part II of this Comment examines the statutory

HEARINGS, AND INDEFINITE DETENTION IN THE US IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 3 (2010).
8. Id.
9. Id.; see also id. at 21 (“The proceedings themselves involve two stages: first, a determination
of whether the person is inadmissible or deportable; and second, determination of whether the person is
eligible for any discretionary or mandatory relief from removal.”).
10. Id. at 24.
11. Id. Additionally, federal district courts do not hear appeals of deportation orders, but they do
hear petitions for habeas corpus challenging unlawful detention. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 77 (“In some cases, a non-citizen who has been ordered deported by an immigration
judge cannot be expeditiously removed to the country of origin because it does not have diplomatic
relations or repatriation agreements with the US, refuses to receive the person for other reasons, or
simply fails to provide travel documents.”).
14. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2006).
15. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 (2010).
16. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f) (2010); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 66.
17. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(k) (2010); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 78.
18. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 81; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2010).
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provisions and Supreme Court decisions that are relevant to the issue of
indefinite detention of removable aliens. Part III analyzes the Fifth,
Ninth and Tenth Circuits’ decisions regarding federal habeas corpus
petitions filed by aliens challenging their indefinite detentions. Part IV
discusses deficiencies in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ decisions and
provides recommendations to ensure the consistent application of federal
immigration law. Part V concludes that the Tenth Circuit’s decision in
Hernandez-Carrera was superior because it accounts for tenets of
administrative law by giving deference to the Attorney General’s
statutory construction while simultaneously remaining within
constitutional boundaries.
II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND BACKGROUND
The focus of the circuit split revolves around the “[i]nadmissible or
criminal aliens” statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which states that:
[a]n alien ordered removed who is inadmissible . . . , removable . . . , or
who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the
community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be
detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject
to . . . terms of supervision . . . . 19

Significantly, 8 C.F.R. § 241.14—the Attorney General’s “special
circumstances” regulation—is used to determine whether continued
detention of a removable alien is warranted when the alien is “specially
dangerous.” 20 Below, subparts A and B discuss the “[i]nadmissible or
criminal aliens” statute, as well as the Attorney General’s “special
circumstances” regulation. Additionally, subpart C addresses the
Supreme Court’s rulings concerning the propriety of judicial deference
to an agency’s statutory construction.
A. Detention and Removal of Aliens Who Are Ordered Removed: 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)
The provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) at
issue in the circuit courts, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), titled “[i]nadmissible
or criminal aliens,” authorizes the Attorney General to prolong the
detention of certain classes of aliens beyond the removal period. 21 The
statute applies to three classes of aliens: (1) aliens who do not meet

19. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2006) (emphasis added).
20. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14 (2010).
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
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statutory admission qualifications and who have been “ordered
removed;” 22 (2) aliens who have been “ordered removed” for security or
policy reasons or because they violated status requirements, entry
conditions, or criminal laws; or (3) aliens “ordered removed” who have
been deemed by the Attorney General to pose a community safety risk
or who the Attorney General believes may flee the jurisdiction. 23 The
goal of this provision is two-fold: to ensure that aliens will appear at
subsequent immigration proceedings, and to provide for the safety of the
community by continued detention. 24
B. The Attorney General’s Construction of the “[I]nadmissible or
[C]riminal [A]liens” Statute
In furtherance of the post-removal provision of the INA, federal
regulation 8 C.F.R. § 241.14—the “special circumstances” provision—
allows the U.S. government to “continue detention of particular
removable aliens on account of special circumstances even though there
is no significant likelihood that the alien will be removed in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” 25
The U.S. Attorney General
promulgated this regulation in response to the Supreme Court’s decision
in Zadvydas v. Davis, which held impermissible the indefinite detention
of certain aliens. 26 The regulation provides for the continued detention
of certain categories of aliens in a manner that comports with
constitutional requirements for due process. 27 The revised provision, in
compliance with Zadvydas, narrows the scope of the INA’s authority to
detain aliens indefinitely after a removal order has been finalized.28 The
Attorney General drafted the regulation in a manner that interpreted the
“[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute as an authorization of an

22. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (West 2010) (discussing “Admission Qualifications for Aliens”).
23. Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 482 (5th Cir. 2008).
24. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). In dicta, the Court in Zadvydas determined
that the statute’s basic purpose is to effectuate removal of aliens and that the provision is part of that
statute. Id. at 690. There is some disagreement about the purpose of the statute, but courts have failed
to analyze the statute’s purpose in greater detail. See Myrna Pages, Note, Indefinite Detention: Tipping
the Scale Toward the Liberty Interest of Freedom After Zadvydas v. Davis, 66 ALB. L. REV. 1213,
1227–28 (2003) (discussing the statute’s purpose and the purpose of extended detention, noting that
Justice Kennedy, in his Zadvydas dissent, argued that the purpose of extended detention is to ensure
public safety, not to effectuate removal).
25. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(a) (2010) (emphasis added).
26. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689.
27. Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1245 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
1011 (2009).
28. See id. at 1251–55; see also Marquez-Coromina v. Hollingsworth, 692 F. Supp. 2d 565, 569–
70 (D. Md. 2010).
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alien’s prolonged detention in limited circumstances, subject to specific
procedural requirements. 29
Under the “special circumstances” provision, there are “four
categories of aliens whose special circumstances warrant continued
detention,” including “aliens determined to pose a special danger to the
public.” 30 In order to prolong the detention of an alien who falls within
this “special danger to the public” category, the government must follow
certain procedural requirements.
First, the government must
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) the alien has
committed “crimes of violence;” 31 (2) the alien is likely to commit
future acts of violence as a result of “a mental condition or personality
disorder;” and (3) there are no release conditions that “can reasonably be
expected to ensure the safety of the public.” 32 Once this evidentiary
standard is satisfied, the procedure for continued detention requires a
medical and psychiatric examination of the alien, 33 a referral to an
immigration judge, 34 a reasonable cause hearing 35 as well as a merits
hearing, 36 and, if warranted, periodic case reviews once the alien has
29. Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1245.
30. Id. at 1243; see also 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(b)–(d), (f). The other categories of aliens whose
special circumstances warrant continued detention are: “(1) aliens with a highly contagious disease that
is a threat to public safety; (2) aliens detained on account of serious adverse foreign policy consequences
of release; (3) aliens detained on account of security or terrorism concerns . . . .” Hernandez-Carrera,
547 F.3d at 1243 (citation omitted).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2006) (defining a crime of violence and noting “[t]he term ‘crime of
violence’ means — (a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that,
by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may
be used in the course of committing the offense”).
32. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)(1)(i)–(iii); see also 18 U.S.C. § 16.
33. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)(3).
34. Id. § 241.14(g) (“Jurisdiction for an immigration judge to review a determination . . . that an
alien is specially dangerous shall commence with the filing by the Service of a Notice of Referral to the
Immigration Judge . . . with the Immigration Court having jurisdiction over the place of the alien’s
custody.”).
35. Id. § 241.14(h) (“The immigration judge shall hold a preliminary hearing to determine
whether the evidence supporting the Service’s determination is sufficient to establish reasonable cause
to go forward with a merits hearing . . . .”).
36. Id. § 241.14(i). At the merits hearing, the government must prove that the alien should
remain in custody because the alien’s release would pose a special danger to the public under the
standards in 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)(1). The regulation states that:
In making any determination in a merits hearing . . . the immigration judge shall consider
the following non-exclusive list of factors:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

The alien’s prior criminal history, particularly the nature and seriousness
of any prior crimes involving violence or threats of violence;
The alien’s previous history of recidivism, if any, upon release from either
Service or criminal custody;
The substantiality of the Service’s evidence regarding the alien’s current
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been deemed a special danger to the public. 37
C. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the “[I]nadmissible or
[C]riminal [A]liens” Statute
The Court has issued two major decisions addressing the indefinite
detention of aliens, Zadvydas v. Davis and Clark v. Martinez. This
subpart discusses these opinions and their practical implications.
1. Zadvydas v. Davis
In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court addressed whether the postremoval-period “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute authorizes
detention of a removable alien “indefinitely beyond the removal period”
or whether the statute authorizes detention only for the time necessary
for the government to secure removal. 38 The Court held that the statute
“limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably
necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” 39
In doing so, however, the Court emphasized the statute’s ambiguity. 40
Moreover, the Court noted that it was unable to find “any clear
indication of congressional intent to grant the Attorney General the
power to hold indefinitely in confinement an alien ordered removed.” 41
Finding that the language of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens”
statute was ambiguous, the Court further noted that the drafters’
inclusion of the word “may” suggested that discretion should be used in
implementing the provision. 42
Despite the statute’s ambiguity, the Court chose an interpretation that
avoided the “serious constitutional threat” of a possible due process

(iv)
(v)

mental condition or personality disorder;
The likelihood that the alien will engage in acts of violence in the future;
and
The nature and seriousness of the danger to the public posed by the alien’s
release.

Id. § 241.14(i)(2)(i)–(v).
37. Id. § 241.14(k).
38. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001).
39. Id. at 689.
40. Id. at 697.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id. (“‘An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible . . . removable . . . or who has been
determine by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of
removal, may be detained beyond the removal period . . . .’” (emphasis added) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(6) (2006))).
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violation. 43 The Court recognized that “the Due Process Clause applies
to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their
presence [in the U.S.] is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” 44
Thus, the Court interpreted the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens”
statute in a manner that allowed the Court to avoid ruling on the
provision’s constitutionality. 45
Ultimately, however, the Court’s determination that the statute does
not allow indefinite detention implicitly accounted for due process
requirements. 46 Attempting to create uniformity in the statute’s
administration, the Court concluded that a six-month period was
presumptively the amount of time reasonably necessary to determine
whether the government will be able to remove an alien. 47
2. Clark v. Martinez
While Zadvydas addressed the indefinite detention of removable
aliens, the Court, in Clark v. Martinez, grappled with the indefinite
detention of inadmissible aliens not entitled to enter the U.S. 48 The
Court applied the Zadvydas construction of the “[i]nadmissible or
criminal aliens” provision to inadmissible aliens and found that the
statute’s crucial terminology applied—without distinction—to each of
the three categories of aliens who were subject to it. 49 The Court noted
the ambiguities in the statute’s language and relied on the finding in
Zadvydas that there were two plausible readings of the provision: one
that authorized indefinite detention yet approached constitutional
limitations, and one that authorized detention for only the amount of
time necessary to effectuate removal. 50 Further, the Court noted that the
43. Id. at 699.
44. Id. at 693. But see Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1254 (10th Cir. 2008)
(discussing what process is due to an alien and how this is unclear in the courts), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
1011 (2009).
45. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689 (“‘It is a cardinal principal’ of statutory interpretation . . . that
when an Act of Congress raises ‘a serious doubt’ as to its constitutionality, ‘this Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.’”
(citations omitted)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 701.
48. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 373 (2005). Martinez and Benitez, the detained aliens in
this case, entered the U.S. from Cuba as part of the Mariel boatlift. Id. at 374. They were paroled into
the U.S. and given the opportunity “to adjust their status to that of lawful permanent resident after one
year.” Id. Neither of the men qualified for the adjustment to their status, as they had become
inadmissible due to prior criminal convictions in the U.S. Id. As a result, they were detained and
ordered removed to Cuba. Id. at 375.
49. Id. at 378.
50. Id. at 384.
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Zadvydas decision relied on both statutory ambiguity and constitutional
avoidance. 51 Martinez emphasized the necessity of consistency when
interpreting the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute and left no
available justifications for allowing the same detention provision to have
different meanings depending on an alien’s classification. 52
D. Agency Construction of a Statute
Despite the Court’s unambiguous holding regarding the indefinite
detention of inadmissible or removable aliens, administrative law
principles establish that government agencies have discretion in
construing statutes when deciding certain types of cases. The Supreme
Court addressed the issue of conflicting statutory interpretations between
the judiciary and an agency in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. and National Cable and Telecommunications
Association v. Brand X Internet Services. 53 The Court’s decisions in
these cases establishes that courts should defer to an agency’s
construction of an ambiguous statute—even if the agency’s construction
conflicts with a prior judicial construction—so long as the construction
is reasonable. 54 In accordance with this discretion, administrative law
courts have reached different conclusions regarding the indefinite
detention of “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens.” 55
In Chevron the Court established a two-part test to determine when
courts must give deference to “an agency’s construction of a statute that
it administers.” 56 Chevron deference is due when “the [pertinent] statute
is silent or ambiguous” on the issue in question and when the agency’s
construction is “a permissible construction of the statute.” 57 Further
clarifying the Chevron decision, the Court in Brand X ruled that a “prior
judicial construction of a statute trumps [a subsequent] agency
51. Id. at 379; see also id. at 381 (noting that the canon of constitutional avoidance “allows
courts to avoid the decision of constitutional questions” and “ is a tool for choosing between competing
plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not
intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts”).
52. Id. at 380.
53. Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
1011 (2009); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); Nat’l
Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).
54. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1244.
55. See id. at 1252.
56. Id.; see also J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Tailoring Deference to Variety with a Wink and a Nod
to Chevron: The Roberts Court and the Amorphous Doctrine of Judicial Review of Agency
Interpretations of Law, 36 J. LEGIS. 18, 41–46 (2010) (discussing the Chevron “two-step doctrine”).
57. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see also Robin Kundis Craig, Administrative Law in the Roberts
Court: The First Four Years, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 69, 144–46 (2010).
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construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior
court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous
terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.” 58
In Chevron, the Court did not create its own construction of the
statute in question but instead simply addressed whether the agency’s
construction was permissible. 59 The Court decided the proper standard
of review to be applied to a government agency’s interpretation of a
statute and discussed ambiguities within statutory text. 60 The Court
ruled that an agency’s jurisdiction to administer a statute includes the
“authority . . . to fill the statutory gap in a reasonable fashion.”61
Furthermore, the Court remarked that the judiciary may not impose its
own interpretation of a statute in lieu of an agency’s reasonable
interpretation. 62
In Brand X, the Court addressed whether the Ninth Circuit’s prior
construction of the Communications Act barred a subsequent
interpretation by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). 63
The Court applied the Chevron framework to the FCC’s interpretation of
the Communications Act, concluding that “[i]f a statute is
ambiguous . . . and if the implementing agency’s construction is
reasonable,” the court must, in accordance with Chevron, defer to the
agency’s construction “even if the agency’s reading differs from what
the court believes is the best . . . interpretation.” 64 The Court further
noted that the question of “whether Congress has delegated to an agency
the authority to interpret a statute” depends on whether the provision at
issue meets the requirements of Chevron. 65 This delegation of authority
does not, however, depend on the temporal sequence of “the judicial and
administrative constructions.” 66
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The issue is relatively straightforward: whether the “[i]nadmissible or
criminal aliens” statute permits the continued detention of certain
classifications of removable aliens beyond the statutory removal period.
In answering this question, the circuits must decide which interpretation
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n, 545 U.S. at 982 (emphasis added).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.
Id.
Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n, 545 U.S. at 980 (describing the holding of Chevron).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n, 545 U.S. at 982.
Id. at 980.
Id. at 983.
Id.
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of the statute is superior—the Supreme Court’s narrow construction in
Zadvydas or the Attorney General’s broad construction in line with the
“special circumstances” regulation and the Supreme Court’s Chevron
and Brand X rulings. This Part examines the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits’ various constructions of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens”
statute.
A. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ Interpretation: Thai v. Ashcroft and
Tran v. Mukasey
According to the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the Attorney General’s
broad construction is impermissible. In Thai v. Ashcroft, for example,
the Ninth Circuit examined whether the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute authorized the
continued detention of a removable alien based upon the Attorney
General’s finding that the alien was “specially dangerous” to the
community because of mental illness. 67 In affirming the lower court’s
grant of Tuan Thai’s habeas corpus petition, the Ninth Circuit held that
the Supreme Court’s construction of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal
aliens” statute prohibited Thai’s continued detention, despite the
presence of circumstances that put community safety at risk. 68
Thai entered the U.S. from Vietnam as a lawful permanent resident, 69
but subsequently established a criminal record with “convictions for
assault, harassment, and third-degree rape.” 70 After serving sentences
for these crimes, Thai was taken into government custody so that
removal proceedings could begin, with the goal of sending Thai back to
Vietnam. 71 An immigration judge found that Thai was removable, but
Vietnamese government officials were uncooperative in providing travel
documents, thereby rendering Thai’s removal “not reasonably
foreseeable.” 72 Thai challenged his continued detention by filing a
habeas corpus petition, 73 which was granted by the district court. 74 The
67. Thai v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 790, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2004).
68. Id. at 792.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2010). This statute describes the “[p]ower to grant [the] writ”
of habeas corpus, and states:
(a)

Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof,
the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The
order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the
district wherein the restraint complained of is had.
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government appealed the district court’s order, initiated continued
detention proceedings pursuant to the “special circumstances”
regulation, 75 and established what the immigration judge viewed as
“clear and convincing evidence that Thai’s release would pose a special
danger to the public.” 76
Despite evidence of Thai’s mental instability and violent tendencies,
the Ninth Circuit interpreted Zadvydas to establish that the
“[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute was a bar to “post-removalperiod detention of an alien once removal [was] no longer reasonably
foreseeable.” 77 Because it was undisputed that Thai’s removal was “not
reasonably foreseeable,” the court determined that Thai’s continued
detention was impermissible under Supreme Court precedent. 78
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s argument
that Thai’s continued detention was authorized under both Zadvydas and
the “special circumstances” provision. 79 The government asserted that
Zadvydas established an exception to the six-month presumption for
“specially dangerous” individuals and further contended that the “special
circumstances” regulation was articulated in light of this Zadvydas
exception. 80 According to the Ninth Circuit, however, Zadvydas did not
intend to create a class of aliens whose detention would not be subject to
(b)

(c)

The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit judge may decline to
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the
application for hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction
to entertain it.
The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless—
(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)

(5)

He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or
is committed for trial before some court thereof; or
He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of
Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of
the United States; or
He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States; or
He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in custody
for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority,
privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, order
or sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and
effect of which depend upon the law of nations; or
It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial.

Id.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Thai, 366 F.3d at 792–93.
Id. at 793; see also 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f) (2010).
Thai, 366 F.3d at 793.
Id. at 798.
Id.
See id. at 794–98.
Id. at 794.
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limitation. 81 According to the Ninth Circuit, Zadvydas explicated
situations where the ninety-day rule may be inappropriate and detention
for the presumptive period of six months would instead be permissible. 82
In response to the post-Zadvydas enactment of the “special
circumstances” provision, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Attorney
General’s regulation was invalid because it allowed the government to
take actions prohibited under the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens”
statute. 83 The court relied solely on the narrow Zadvydas construction
of the statute in reaching its decision, reasoning that because the “special
circumstances” regulation was in conflict with the statute, the statute
must control. 84 The court determined that the limitations on the statute
established in Zadvydas should apply to Thai’s case as well. 85 Though
the court distinguished Thai from the habeas petitioner in Zadvydas by
noting the presence of Thai’s “ill mental health” coupled with
dangerousness, the court refused to permit Thai’s indefinite detention on
account of this additional mental instability. 86 In its ruling, the Ninth
Circuit failed to comment on the ambiguity of the “[i]nadmissible or
criminal aliens” provision as well as the administrative deference
imposed by Chevron and Brand X. 87
In Tran v. Mukasey, the Fifth Circuit also addressed whether the
Zadvydas construction of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute
authorized continued detention of removable aliens when the
government has determined that the alien’s mental illness renders him a
danger to the community. 88 The Tran court reasoned that it was “bound
by the statutory construction put forward” in Zadvydays and Martinez 89
and construed the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute narrowly. 90

81. See id. at 794–98.
82. Id. at 795 (“The statement in Zadvydas that noncriminal detention by the Government is
permissible only in narrow nonpunitive circumstances was intended to illustrate what the Government is
generally prohibited from doing, and what it may in some circumstances be permitted to do. It did not
state what the Government is authorized to do under § 1231(a)(6).”).
83. See id. at 798–99.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 798.
86. See id. (The court does “not believe that Zadvydas can properly be read to prohibit the
indefinite detention of dangerous resident aliens like Ma, while allowing the indefinite detention of
dangerous resident aliens like Thai. An alien’s ill mental health coupled with dangerousness cannot
justify indefinite detention under Zadvydas when dangerousness alone cannot justify such detention.”).
87. See id. at 790.
88. Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 479 (5th Cir. 2008).
89. Id. at 484; see also Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312 (1994) (“It is [the
Supreme Court’s] responsibility to say what a statute means, and once the Court has spoken, it is the
duty of other courts to respect that understanding of the governing rule of law.”).
90. See Tran, 515 F.3d 478.
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The court ruled that the alien’s indefinite detention was impermissible. 91
The alien in this case, Ha Tran, was a Vietnamese citizen admitted to
the U.S. as a refugee and was later granted the status of a lawful
permanent resident. 92 After criminal convictions for firearm possession
as well as assault and battery against his wife, Tran was confined to a
mental hospital for two years, diagnosed with mental illness, and
transferred to a halfway house. 93 Upon his release, Tran murdered his
wife. 94 He was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to prison. 95
During his second incarceration, DHS took custody of Tran and
initiated deportation proceedings. 96 After it became clear that his
removal from the U.S. was “not reasonably foreseeable,” Tran filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus to terminate his detention. 97 The
government argued that the district court erred in granting Tran’s habeas
petition by following Zadvydas and that the court instead should have
deferred, as required under Chevron, to the Attorney General’s
interpretation of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute. 98 The
Fifth Circuit, however, declined to give Chevron deference to the
Attorney General’s interpretation of the statute and instead found that
Zadvydas resolved the “ambiguity by imposing a requirement
that . . . detention last no longer than reasonably necessary to effectuate
removal.” 99 Thus, the Tran court concluded that the government’s
interpretation of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute was
impermissible and not due Chevron deference because Zadvydas
removed any ambiguity in the statute’s meaning. 100

91. Id. at 479.
92. Id. at 480.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 480.
97. Id. at 481. Tran was being detained under 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f) after he was taken into
custody by DHS during his manslaughter sentence. Id. at 480. DHS decided to continue custody based
upon a finding that Tran’s mental illness would cause him to commit acts of violence in the future
despite the acknowledgment that Tran was unlikely to be removed in the foreseeable future. Id. The
Board of Immigration Appeals later found that the Government had established by clear and convincing
evidence that Tran had met the criteria for continued detention under 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f). Id. at 480–
81.
98. Id. at 481, 484.
99. Id. at 484.
100. Id.
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B. The Tenth Circuit: Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson
In Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, the Tenth Circuit addressed
whether the Attorney General’s construction of the “[i]nadmissible or
criminal aliens” statute required deference in light of the Supreme
Court’s contrary interpretation of the statute in Zadvydas and
Martinez. 101 The Hernandez-Carrera court used a two-part analysis in
addressing the issue, first asking “whether ‘the statute [was] silent or
ambiguous’” with regards to the authority of the Attorney General to
detain specific classes of aliens past the “removal period,” and second
asking whether the Attorney General’s construction was acceptable.102
The court addressed these questions in light of Chevron and Brand X,
and concluded that the Attorney General’s “subsequent, reasonable . . .
interpretation of [the] ambiguous statute” did not raise constitutional
questions and was therefore entitled to judicial deference.103
The petitioners in this case, Santos Hernandez-Carrera and Pablo
Santiago Hernandez-Arenado, were native citizens of Cuba who entered
the U.S. illegally during the 1980 Mariel boatlift. 104 Classified as
inadmissible aliens, both men were granted immigration parole in the
U.S. 105 After criminal convictions, the government revoked parole, and
the men were issued exclusion and deportation orders, based upon each
man’s “lack of entry documents and convictions for crimes of moral
turpitude.” 106
After the final orders of removal were issued,
immigration judges, pursuant to the “special circumstances” regulation,
ordered the continued detention of both men because of their criminal
records and the poor results of their mental health evaluations. 107
Hernandez-Carrera had an exhaustive criminal history, including
convictions for rape with force and bodily injury, battery, and indecent
exposure. 108 After his incarceration, Hernandez-Carrera was detained,
taken into custody by the INS and diagnosed with schizophrenia. 109 He
refused to take medication for his illness, and assessments by mental
health experts concluded that Hernandez-Carrera “would be a direct
danger to the public” and “quite likely” to engage in future violence if
101. Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
1011 (2009).
102. Id. at 1244–45.
103. Id. at 1242.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1242–44.
108. Id. at 1243.
109. Id.
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released from detention. 110
Accordingly, an immigration judge
concluded that there were “no reasonable conditions of release” that
could be imposed on Hernandez-Carrera to “ensure public safety.” 111
The immigration court similarly deemed Hernandez-Arenado a
danger to the public because of his mental illness and criminal
history. 112 Hernandez-Arenado “admitted to involvement in ‘several
hundred’ pedophilic contacts with children in Cuba and in the United
States” and was taken into INS custody after being imprisoned for the
sexual assault of a seven-year-old boy. 113 During his detention,
Hernandez-Arenado was diagnosed with mental illness, in this case
pedophilia. 114 Subsequent evaluations determined that HernandezArenado could not be released from detention without exposing the
public to danger. 115 Mental health experts concluded that he was
unlikely to change his behavior or cease to act on his impulses,
especially given the fact that Hernandez-Arenado stated several times
that “he [did] not believe [that] sex with children [was] wrong.” 116 An
immigration judge agreed with these mental health evaluations and
noted that if Hernandez-Arenado was released from detention, nothing
would prevent him from molesting more children. 117 Thus, as in the
case of Hernandez-Carrera, the judge ruled that “no reasonable
conditions of release [could] reasonably be expected to ensure the safety
of the public.” 118
Both Hernandez-Carrera and Hernandez-Arenado filed petitions for
writs of habeas corpus, alleging that their continued detention was
unconstitutional. 119 Given that they were diagnosed with “harmthreatening mental illness[es] and [were] likely to engage in violent
behavior if released such that public safety [could not] reasonably be
guaranteed,” the district court addressed whether it was constitutionally
permissible for the Attorney General to continue detention “beyond the
presumptive six month post-removal detention period” despite the fact
that removal was “not reasonably foreseeable.” 120 The district court,
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1243.
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1186 (D. Kan. 2008), vacated and
remanded by 547 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (2009).
120. Id. at 1189.
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like the lower courts in Thai and Tran, found that the Attorney General’s
interpretation of the “special circumstances” regulation was not
permitted under the Supreme Court’s construction of the “[i]nadmissible
or criminal aliens” statute. 121 Consequently, the district court concluded
that Zadvydas and Martinez explicated settled law on the issue and
granted writs to both petitioners. 122
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit addressed whether the Attorney
General’s construction of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute,
as articulated through the “special circumstances” regulation, should be
given deference in spite of the Supreme Court’s contrary constructions
in Zadvydas and Martinez. 123 The court used a three-part analysis to
reach its decision.
1. Whether the “Inadmissible or Criminal Aliens” Statute Was Silent or
Ambiguous
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis with a finding that the
“[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute was ambiguous. According to
the court, its conclusion was supported by two separate Supreme Court
decisions finding the statute ambiguous. 124 The Tenth Circuit relied on
the Court’s statement in Zadvydas that it was unable to find “‘any clear
indication’” that Congress intended the Attorney General to have the
power to indefinitely detain “‘an alien ordered removed.’” 125 The Tenth
Circuit also cited the Court’s finding in Martinez “that the Zadvydas
Court ‘rel[ied] on ambiguities in the statutory text’ of § 1231(a)(6) when
construing the statute.” 126
As further evidence of the statute’s ambiguity, the Tenth Circuit
emphasized the Court’s application of constitutional avoidance in
Zadvydas and Martinez. 127 The Supreme Court remarked in Martinez
that the canon should be invoked when, “after the application of
ordinary textual analysis, [a] statute is found to be susceptible of more
than one construction.” 128 Conversely, the canon is inapplicable in
statutory interpretation if congressional intent is clear. 129 The Tenth

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id. at 1186.
Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1244.
Id. at 1245.
Id. (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001)).
Id. (quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005)).
Id. at 1244.
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005).
Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1245.
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Circuit reasoned that because the Supreme Court exercised the canon in
two decisions addressing the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens”
provision, it was clear that the Court viewed “the statute as genuinely
susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation.” 130
2. Whether the Attorney General’s Construction Was Permissible
The Tenth Circuit characterized the second part of its analysis as the
“more serious question,” and further divided the issue into three separate
inquiries. 131
a. Whether Brand X Applies to the Supreme Court’s Statutory
Interpretations
In its initial inquiry, the Hernandez-Carrera court concluded that the
Attorney General’s construction of the statute was owed Chevron
deference to the extent that it was reasonable. 132 The Tenth Circuit
evaluated the reasonableness of the Attorney General’s construction by
first addressing the role of judicial deference to administrative
interpretations of a statute. 133 The court noted that deference is not
simply a policy choice but instead “a means of giving effect to
congressional intent.” 134 As such, when Congress creates an agencyadministered statute that is filled with gaps, it is, by implication,
entrusting the agency to fill in the missing pieces that are necessary for a
practical application of the statute. 135 Further, the court inferred that
because Congress specifically authorized the Attorney General to create
rules concerning the detention of aliens ordered removed, Congress
thereby delegated authority to the Attorney General to address existing
ambiguities in the statute it was charged with enforcing. 136 The court
concluded that if it were to favor the judiciary’s interpretation “over a
reasonable administrative agency construction,” the court “would be
ignoring Congress’s choice to empower an agency, rather than the
courts, to resolve this kind of statutory ambiguity.” 137
The Tenth Circuit also addressed Hernandez-Carrera and Hernandez-

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
See id. at 1245–46.
Id. at 1246.
Id. at 1246.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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Arenado’s argument that the rule established in Brand X could only be
applied to lower court decisions, not to Supreme Court decisions. 138
The Brand X decision addressed a Ninth Circuit statutory construction,
but the Tenth Circuit ultimately disagreed with the aliens’ argument and
applied Brand X to interpretations made by both the Supreme Court and
the lower courts. 139 The court extended the Brand X rule upon the
premise that agency deference in both lower court and Supreme Court
decisions gives necessary “weight to Congress’[s] intent to vest an
agency with the power to” be a statutory gap filler. 140
Additionally, the court noted that if Brand X were applied only to
lower court decisions, the timing of the Supreme Court’s construction of
a statute would determine whether an agency interpretation could be
given deference. 141 That is, if an agency interpretation occurred
subsequent to a Supreme Court construction, the agency would not be
given deference and would also be precluded “from revising unwise
judicial constructions of ambiguous statutes” in the future. 142 Further,
the court emphasized that limiting application of Brand X to lower court
decisions would disregard the central premise of both Chevron and
Brand X, namely that Congress intended “for agencies, not courts, to fill
statutory gaps.” 143
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that its application of the Brand X
rule to Supreme Court statutory interpretations would conflict with the
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Tran v. Mukasey and the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Thai v. Ashcroft. 144 As discussed in subpart III.A, the courts
in both cases based their rulings on the proposition that the Supreme
Court’s holding in Zadvydas was a definitive interpretation of the
“[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute. 145 The Tenth Circuit,
however, disagreed that Zadvydas was the final word on the issue and
instead concluded that under Brand X an agency may, after a judicial
interpretation has been rendered, choose a disparate statutory

138. See id. at 1246–47; Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 982 (2005) (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction
follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”).
139. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1246–48.
140. Id. at 1247.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 983
(1984)).
144. Id. at 1248; Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2008); Thai v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 790
(9th Cir. 2004).
145. Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1248.
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construction because the agency is the interpreter of the statute within
reasonable limits. 146 Thus, according to the Tenth Circuit, Tran and
Thai should have addressed whether the Attorney General’s construction
of the statute was reasonable, not whether Zadvydas authorized the
indefinite detention protested by the aliens. 147 The Tenth Circuit
concluded that Zadvydas was not a resolution of the statutory ambiguity
of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” provision but instead it was a
refusal by the Court to defer to the unreasonable and constitutionallyflawed agency interpretation. 148 According to the Tenth Circuit,
Zadvydas did not establish that the Court’s construction was the only
reasonable construction possible. 149
b. Whether Deference to the Attorney General’s Interpretation Is
Precluded by Constitutional Avoidance
The Tenth Circuit’s next step in its analysis discussed the canon of
constitutional avoidance and its interplay with principles of
administrative deference. 150 The court concluded that an agency may
interpret a statute in a reasonable and constitutionally permissible
manner, despite the fact that another court has already construed the
same statute within the confines of the Constitution. 151
Under the canon of constitutional avoidance, a court must construe a
statute in a way that avoids “‘serious constitutional problems’” when
“‘an otherwise acceptable construction of [the] statute’” would raise
these issues. 152 Hernandez-Carrera and Hernandez-Arenado argued that
the canon should transcend Chevron deference and should therefore
preclude the court’s acceptance of the Attorney General’s “special
circumstances” regulation. 153 The government, in response, argued that
when Chevron deference to an agency interpretation is appropriate, such
deference should not be precluded by constitutional avoidance. 154 The

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1249.
149. Id. (“In no way, however, did the Court signal that its interpretation was the only reasonable
construction of § 1231(a)(6). To the contrary, the Court specifically found the statute to be ambiguous.
Moreover, the Court explicitly recognized that its construction of the statute was not the only reasonable
one possible.” (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697, 701 (2001)).
150. See id. at 1249–51.
151. Id. at 1251.
152. Id. at 1249 (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
153. Id.
154. Id.
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Tenth Circuit relied upon the established principle “that the canon of
constitutional avoidance does constrain an agency’s discretion to
interpret statutory ambiguities, even when Chevron deference would
otherwise be due,” 155 and found a middle ground between each side’s
arguments. 156 The court concluded that constitutional avoidance may
bar an agency construction that raises “substantial constitutional
doubts,” although the Attorney General’s construction of the
“[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute, promulgated through the
“special circumstances” provision, did not create such uncertainty.157
The court then addressed the interplay between Chevron deference
and the constitutional avoidance canon in emphasizing that Chevron
indicated “that Congress generally intends to empower an agency to
resolve certain statutory ambiguities,” while the canon of constitutional
avoidance implies that Congress does not typically intend to authorize
agencies to fill in statutory gaps in a manner that evokes “substantial
constitutional doubts.” 158 In a situation involving an ambiguous statute
with the resulting possibility of multiple interpretations that each avoid
constitutional doubts, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that one court’s
construction does not foreclose the administering agency from adopting
a different yet reasonable interpretation so long as constitutional
concerns are avoided. 159 Further, the court ruled that an agency may
reinterpret a statute in a way that differs from the agency’s previous
construction. 160 So long as reinterpretation avoids constitutional doubts,
it will be given Chevron deference 161 even if it conflicts with an
intermediate judicial construction of the statute that also applied the
avoidance canon. 162
c. Whether the Attorney General’s Construction Raises “Serious
Constitutional Doubts”
In the final step of its analysis, the Tenth Circuit discussed the
substantive and procedural requirements of the “special circumstances”
regulation. 163
The court concluded that the Attorney General’s
155. Id. (emphasis added).
156. Id. at 1249.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1250.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1251.
161. Id. (noting that the reinterpretation should be given deference “to the extent that would
otherwise be appropriate under the Chevron framework”).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1251–56.
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construction of the statute, as revised under Zadvydas, no longer raised
“serious constitutional doubts” because it contained “substantive
limitations built into the [agency’s] power to detain aliens beyond the
removal period” and provided “procedural protections . . . sufficient to
satisfy due process.” 164
The Attorney General’s original interpretation of the statute, at issue
in Zadvydas, was overbroad because it permitted the indefinite detention
of all removable aliens covered by the “[i]nadmissible or criminal
aliens” statute, notwithstanding the alien’s dangerousness or special
circumstances. 165 That construction was also procedurally deficient
because it included, among other things, a presumption of the alien’s
dangerousness, which the alien had the burden of disproving. 166 If
unable to meet this burden, the alien was subject to indefinite
detention. 167
The Attorney General’s revised construction of the statute was drafted
in consideration of the Supreme Court’s remark in Zadvydas that when
detention of an alien “is of potentially indefinite duration, [the Court
has] also demanded that the dangerousness rationale be accompanied by
some other special circumstance, such as mental illness, that helps to
create the danger.” 168 Under the Attorney General’s revised regulation,
the indefinite detention of an alien ordered removed requires the
government to follow specific procedural protocol, including a showing
that the alien is dangerous and that there are additional special
circumstances present. 169
Hernandez-Carrera and Hernandez-Arenado made several objections
to the “special circumstances” regulation, but the Tenth Circuit found
the provision reasonable and the aliens’ objections unfounded. 170
Significantly, the aliens argued that the Attorney General’s regulation
did not satisfy their right to due process. 171 The Tenth Circuit, however,
disagreed and noted that it was unclear whether aliens are entitled to the
same due process rights as citizens or lawful permanent residents. 172

164. Id. at 1251 (emphasis added).
165. See id. at 1252.
166. See id.
167. Id.; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 691 (2001).
168. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691; see also Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1253.
169. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1253–54; 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(a)–(k) (2010).
170. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1254–56.
171. See id. at 1254.
172. See id. (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 (1976) (“The fact that all persons, aliens and
citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further conclusion that all
aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship, or, indeed, to the conclusion that all aliens
must be placed in a single homogeneous legal classification.”)).
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The aliens also objected to the evidence standard imposed by the
“special circumstances” regulation, which requires the government to
prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that an alien is dangerous. 173
Hernandez-Carrera and Hernandez-Arenado argued that the evidentiary
standard should be heightened to a standard requiring the government to
show dangerousness “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 174 The court again
disagreed, reasoning that the “clear and convincing evidence” standard
was sufficient because the Supreme Court had previously upheld this
same standard in a case involving an indefinite civil commitment
proceeding. 175
In light of its judgment that the Attorney General’s construction of the
“[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute was reasonable and that the
construction avoided serious constitutional questions, the Tenth Circuit
denied the aliens’ habeas corpus petitions and gave Chevron deference
to the Attorney General’s statutory interpretation. 176
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS
The current state of immigration law regarding the indefinite
detention of removable aliens deemed both dangerous and mentally ill is
problematic in light of the fact that the circuit courts are split on the
permissibility of this narrow class of aliens’ indefinite detention. 177 This
Part discusses why the Tenth Circuit’s understanding of the relevant
statute is superior to that of the other circuits. This Part also suggests
potential future governmental actions in order to promote clarity,
uniformity, and humanity in federal immigration law.

173. See id. at 1254; 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(i), (l) (2010).
174. Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1254.
175. Id. The Hernandez-Carrera court remarked that Addington “noted that given the
uncertainties of psychological diagnosis, a reasonable doubt standard might ‘impose a burden that the
state cannot meet,’ and that a clear and convincing evidence standard was sufficient to satisfy due
process.” Id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 (1979)). The Tenth Circuit reasoned that a
higher standard was not “constitutionally compelled in the context of aliens subject to exclusion and
deportation orders.” Id.
176. Id. at 1256.
177. See supra Part III. Compare Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2008), and Thai v.
Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding impermissible the indefinite detention of an alien
ordered removed who the government finds dangerous because of mental illness), with HernandezCarrera, 547 F.3d 1237 (upholding the Attorney General’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and
allowing indefinite detention in specific limited circumstances).
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A. The Tenth Circuit’s Understanding of the Statute Is Superior
The Tenth Circuit permitted the government to impose indefinite
detention on removable aliens who were both dangerous and mentally
ill, 178 and adopted a preferable reading of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal
aliens” statute. The Tenth Circuit’s opinion accounted for a variety of
overlapping considerations, including the ambiguity of the statute, the
constitutionality of the Attorney General’s construction, principles of
agency deference, and overall policy objectives. 179
Under Chevron and Brand X, a court may defer to an agency’s
construction of an ambiguous statute so long as the construction is
reasonable. 180 In the context of immigration law, the Supreme Court has
previously remanded cases involving interpretation of the Immigration
and Nationality Act to lower administrative courts, because,
comparatively speaking, the executive branch has more expertise in
foreign relations issues and because gaps in a statute are best filled by
the administering agency. 181
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in
Hernandez-Carrera recognizes the proper roles of Chevron and Brand X
in guiding judicial deference to an agency’s statutory interpretation. The
Tenth Circuit adhered to the theory behind Brand X when it concluded
that Congress had charged the Attorney General with administering the
“[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute, and therefore, the Tenth
Circuit correctly determined that the Attorney General was bestequipped to deal with statutory ambiguities. 182
Further, the Tenth Circuit’s reading of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal
aliens” statute was superior because the court gave Chevron deference to
the Attorney General’s “special circumstances” regulation. The “special
circumstances” regulation is a reasonable construction of the
“[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute because, unlike the broad
construction advocated by the government in Zadvydas, this revised
regulation has a narrow substantive reach. 183 Notably, the provision
applies only to a limited class of aliens who are both dangerous and
mentally ill. 184 The evidentiary standards mandated under the regulation
require the government to prove an alien’s dangerousness and mental
178. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d 1237.
179. See id.; supra Part III.B.
180. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Nat’l
Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005); see also Craig, supra note
57, at 144.
181. See Craig, supra note 57, at 184–85.
182. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1246; Craig, supra note 57, at 173–74.
183. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1251–56; see also supra Part III.B.
184. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1252–53; 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f) (2010).
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illness by clear and convincing evidence. 185 This is a distinct change
from the Attorney General’s regulation in Zadvydas, which created a
presumption of an alien’s dangerousness that the alien was required to
disprove. 186 Additionally, the procedural safeguards under the “special
circumstances” provision satisfy due process and provide for continuous
agency review of the alien’s case. 187
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ interpretations of the statute, discussed
in Tran and Thai, respectively, incorrectly applied the law. Both circuits
failed to consider recognized principles of administrative law, and
instead, focused solely on Zadvydas. 188 In Chevron and Brand X, the
Supreme Court determined that an agency’s reading of a statute must be
permitted if the statute is ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is
reasonable. 189 Accordingly, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits should have
abided by this precedent and addressed whether the Attorney General’s
interpretation of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” provision was a
reasonable way to construe the ambiguous statute. 190 The circuits failed
to do this and instead reached decisions that did not take into account the
legal principles established in Chevron and Brand X. The Tenth Circuit,
on the other hand, provided a complete analysis of both the
administrative and immigration concerns at issue, and its statutory
construction stands on a solid foundation that melds two branches of the
law and creates a cohesive, practical rule regarding the indefinite
detention of aliens ordered removed.
The Tenth Circuit’s decision is also preferable because, in accepting
the Attorney General’s construction, the court acknowledged the need to
strike a feasible balance between public safety concerns and due process
rights for removable aliens. The numerous procedural steps required to
indefinitely detain an alien under the “special circumstances” regulation
provide the necessary balance. 191
The Supreme Court also
acknowledged the necessity of this balance, noting in Zadvydas that
although ensuring public safety was a serious concern, deprivation of
constitutionally guaranteed rights was also sure to occur as a result of
185. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(i), (1) (2010).
186. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1252; see also supra notes 163–168 and accompanying
text.
187. Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1251; see also 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(k) (2010).
188. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1248–49; Marquez-Coromina v. Hollingsworth, 692 F.
Supp. 2d 565, 572–74 (D. Md. 2010).
189. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Nat’l
Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
190. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1248–49; see also Marquez-Coromina, 692 F. Supp. 2d
at 572–74.
191. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1244–57.
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the Attorney General’s previous broad construction of the
“[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute. 192 Further, the public safety
concern is especially significant given the extreme nature of danger
posed by some alien detainees. 193 If the Tenth Circuit had followed the
same reasoning used by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, then removable
alien Hernandez-Arenado, an admitted pedophile, would have been
released from detention after his habeas petition was granted. Such
release would have granted him the freedom and opportunity to
victimize more young boys, which is especially frightening because
Hernandez-Arenado has said that he does not believe that sex with
children is wrong. 194 As a result of the Tenth Circuit’s decision,
however, Hernandez-Arenado’s habeas corpus petition was denied, and
he will not have access to children, thus protecting public safety while
also providing due process to the detained alien. Because the Tenth
Circuit’s decision strikes the necessary balance between public safety
and due process, the court’s reading of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal
aliens” statute is superior.
The Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits are currently the only circuit
courts to address this issue. Notably, however, the District of Maryland,
located within the Fourth Circuit, was recently presented with a case,
Marquez-Coromina v. Hollingsworth, that was nearly identical to
Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson. 195
In Marquez-Coromina v.
Hollingsworth, an alien who objected to indefinite detention and sought
a habeas corpus petition had a history of violent criminal behavior, was
diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, and refused treatment for his
mental illness. 196 The district court found the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning
in Hernandez-Carrera persuasive and, accordingly, denied the alien’s
habeas petition. 197 The court concluded that the Tenth Circuit’s decision
was consistent with Fourth Circuit precedent regarding similar issues 198
and that the Attorney General’s “special circumstances” regulation
raised no due process concerns. 199 In light of the district court’s
192. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 700 (2001); see also Pages, supra note 24, at 1234–35
(addressing the societal implications of Zadvydas and the concern for public safety).
193. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1243–44 (describing Hernandez-Carrera’s history of
committing crimes of violence and sexual assault, and describing Hernandez-Arenado’s admitted
pedophilia); see also Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 2008) (describing Tran’s convictions
for the assault, battery, and murder of his wife in front of his seven year old daughter).
194. See Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1243.
195. See Marquez-Coromina, 692 F. Supp. 2d at 566–68.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 573–74.
198. Id. at 574 (citing Fernandez v. Keisler, 502 F.3d 337, 347–48 (4th Cir. 2007); Elm Grove
Coal Co. v. Dir., O.W.C.P., 480 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2007)).
199. See id.
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adoption of the Tenth Circuit’s position, other federal courts may follow
the Tenth Circuit’s example.
B. Future Action for the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches
Each branch of government should take action to remedy inconsistent
application of federal law on the indefinite detention issue.
Interpretation of federal immigration statutes can vary greatly among the
circuit courts, as evidenced by the immigration decisions discussed in
this Comment. The geographic location of an alien at the time of
detainment can have as much influence on the outcome of the case as
the factual and legal issues presented to the court. 200 The variability in
judicial interpretation of the INA results in a lack of uniformity in the
application and practice of federal immigration law.201 This is
problematic because federal law governs the United States as a whole
and should, accordingly, be applied consistently, regardless of the
jurisdiction in which an alien is detained. 202
Given the sheer size of immigration courts’ caseload, as well as the
large number of agencies involved in administering and enforcing
federal immigration statutes, it is difficult to conceive a comprehensive
remedy for the overall lack of uniformity in INA interpretation. 203 The
specific issue of permitting indefinite detention of removable aliens who
are “specially dangerous” is, however, narrow enough to warrant
significant legal alterations that would promote standardized practices in
determining whether indefinite detention is appropriate. It is unlikely
that all of the circuit courts will adopt the Tenth Circuit’s position that
the Attorney General’s construction of the “[i]nadmissible or criminal
aliens” statute is reasonable and due deference under Chevron and
Brand X, so this issue is appropriate for the Supreme Court review. The
Court should issue a ruling on this narrow question to provide a superior
judicial precedent and create consistency in the practical application of
the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” statute.
Congress must also take appropriate action to promote uniformity in
the INA. Congress should amend the current “[i]nadmissible or criminal
aliens” statute so that the provision’s language clearly reflects

200. See Paige Taylor, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: A Survey of Selected Fifth Circuit
Immigration Cases, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 989, 990 (2009) (“[W]here one practices could have severe
implications on the availability of relief . . . .”).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 18–24.
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Congress’s intended meaning. 204 Such an amendment would eliminate
the statute’s ambiguity and, as a result, eliminate the necessity of the
Attorney General’s “special circumstances” regulation. A potential
drawback to this solution is that an amended statute may prove too broad
in application and could still be read to permit the indefinite detention of
aliens who do not meet the requirements for both dangerousness and
mental illness. An alternative, and potentially narrower, solution would
arise if Congress “enact[s] a statute that explicitly allows for federal
civil commitment of aliens who pose a danger to the community due to
their mental conditions.” 205 This hypothetical statute should be based
upon the “special circumstances” regulation and ideally should codify
the protocol used by the Attorney General when hearing cases regarding
indefinite detention of “specially dangerous” aliens. 206
The executive branch should also remedy the potential for human
rights violations that arise when dealing with the indefinite detention of
aliens. 207 The Attorney General’s stringent requirements in the “special
circumstances” regulation provide procedures to determine whether an
alien ordered removed should be detained indefinitely. 208
The
regulation does not, however, offer any procedures beyond ongoing
periodic review of a detainee’s case. 209 When an immigration judge
finds that an indefinitely detained removable alien does not qualify for
supervised release, the Attorney General’s federal regulation provides
no further guidance for handling the detainee’s case. 210 In light of the
fact that indefinite detained aliens are unlikely to be removed from the
U.S. in the foreseeable future, the Attorney General must create
additional regulations that terminate immigration proceedings and
provide involuntary civil commitment hearings for indefinitely detained
204. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001) (noting that congressional intent is
unclear).
205. Thai v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 790, 799 (9th Cir. 2004).
206. See Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 485 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting the importance of public
safety, recognizing “that in a similar circumstance where public safety was also of great concern,
Congress took prompt action to address the issue. In particular, in the field of national security,
Congress enacted the Patriot Act which authorizes detention beyond the removal period of any alien
whose removal is not foreseeable . . . if the alien presents a nation security threat,” and concluding that
“Congress has shown that it has the authority and willingness to address these concerns”).
207. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 71–81.
208. See Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
1011 (2009).
209. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 79–80; 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(k) (2010).
210. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 79–80 (noting an immigration judge’s finding
that “no statutory or regulatory authority exists which would allow an immigration judge to terminate a
federal immigration proceeding by ordering the transfer of custody of the alien into the jurisdictional
control of the State of residence in order for an involuntary civil commitment to a mental health
facility”).
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“specially dangerous” aliens. 211 During involuntary civil commitment
hearings, qualified appointed counsel should represent the alien and
serve as an advocate for the detainee. 212 If it is established that the alien
requires psychiatric care, then the alien should be transferred to a
psychiatric facility. 213
The facility’s treatment goals should be
improved functioning and rehabilitation, not permanent detention. 214
Although this additional hearing is unlikely to consistently result in
successful rehabilitation and release, the Attorney General should still
implement the procedure to provide further opportunities for
improvement of the alien’s mental health. Further, the involuntary civil
commitment hearings should still be held for detainees who refuse
mental health treatment, because further immigration proceedings are
unlikely to result in either the alien’s removal from the U.S. or the grant
of supervised release.
In addition to creating procedures for involuntary civil commitment
hearings, the Attorney General should also create an advocacy program
for “specially dangerous” detainees. Aliens with severe mental illness
may be unable to comprehend the removal and post-removal order
proceedings. 215 These aliens are often unable to provide credible and
coherent information to attorneys or judges, understand a judge’s
questions, read or write, comprehend their surroundings, or control their
hallucinations or delusions. 216 To ensure that the interests of these
severely mentally ill detainees are adequately represented in
immigration proceedings, the government should assign a trained
advocate or caseworker to each detainee. 217 This person would be
charged with helping the detainee navigate legal proceedings while
assessing whether the detainee has the capacity to understand the case
against him. An advocacy program would be a significant step toward
protecting an alien’s human rights while simultaneously protecting the
government’s interests in public safety and effectuating an alien’s
removal.

211. See id. at 86.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. Id. at 5.
216. Id. at 6.
217. See id. at 82–86 (providing recommendations to ensure fair immigration proceedings for
aliens with mental disabilities).
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V. CONCLUSION
Hernandez-Carrera is significant because the decision established
specific parameters under which removable aliens who are mentally ill
and who pose a serious danger to the public may be continuously
detained, as well as the proper relationship between agencies and federal
courts. 218 The Tenth Circuit’s decision balances due process concerns
with public safety. 219 The decision also limits the availability of
indefinite detention to a very narrow class of removable aliens. 220 The
Supreme Court should accept certiorari when next given the opportunity
to determine whether the indefinite detention of certain removable aliens
is constitutionally permissible. Additionally, Congress should amend
the “[i]nadmissible or criminal aliens” provision so that the statute’s
language reflects legislative intent. The Attorney General should
similarly modify the “special circumstances” regulation to provide civil
commitment hearings for indefinitely detained aliens who have been
diagnosed with severe mental illness. Doing so will clarify the
appropriate method of managing “specially dangerous” removable
aliens, as well as provide uniformity in federal immigration law.

218. See Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
1011 (2009).
219. Id.
220. Id.
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